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knockahoma · 06-09-2009, 12:41 PM

Continuing the look at Teams through the prism of the TOT/LG stat:

1974 NL West

Dodgers 3.4 TOT/YR
Reds 5.4
Braves 6.0
Astros 0.6
Giants - 0.3
Padres -8.4

The first thing that strikes me is that while, pitching and defense were long aspects of pride for LA, the Reds looked better in both TOT/YR and field percentage. In fact, LA finished a point under league fielding average. The Reds finished just 4 games back, the only real threat to LA.

In actuality, the reps of defensive players remain intact. It was the horrific performances off the bench by Lee Lacy, Von Joshua, Ken McMullen, that brought down LA's score. Jimmy Wynn finished with a nice +12 in CF.

Meanwhile, the Braves had discovered in 1973 that, despite Davey Johnson's bizarre and once in a life-time output of 40 homers, Earl Johnson was right about the second baseman's deteriorating range. He finished with a -8. His double play partner, Marty Perez, had upped his score in 72 (a dreadful -13) to league average. But, together, the Johnson/Perez combo had given up -8 runs below league average. In 74, they moved the infield around, depending on if they faced a righty, or a lefty. Johnson split time between 1B (+8) and 2B (-10). Perez played almost exclusively at 2B where his scores vastly improved (+11, .985%) Robinson moved in at SS and played at league average (+1). But the Braves (based on 135 games) improved greatly at these positions over 73's total. +7 at 1B, +19 at 2B and +1 at SS, for a total of 27 runs saved above average.

The Astros:

Roger Metzger is the surprise to me. In some baseball sims, Metzger was awarded top range. But, by his life-time TOT/YR is only -4. He was a very steady shortstop, though. Once again, I wonder if some gifted athletes at the position flashed with dives, but were often out of position? He had just won the gold glove in 73 with a -4 TOT/YR score. But, he made only 12 errors the entire year.

Doug Rader was the same type fielder. Five gold gloves, only 16 errors in 74, compared with Schmidt who ended Rader's GG dynasty with error totals often in the 20s.

Catcher/1B Cliff Johnson's score makes the traditionalists happy (-19), cancelling out his 10 homers in part-time duty. Lifetime, he was -14 at 1B, -15 at catcher and a hideous -22 in the OF. The Astros knew his 20 homers in 75 probably didn't cover the statistical and psychological damage caused by Johnson's defense. The bat, in their view, wasn't worth the cost.

The Astros sent Johnson off to DH duties in the AL for middle infielder Mike Fischlin.

Houston's other defensive problem was LF Bob Watson. A fine fielding percentage didn't hide the flaw (a consistent -15 over the past 3 years). It's interesting to note that Houston had here the controversial situation. Throw your bats out there and eat the defensive cost, with 1B Lee May, LF Bob Watson and C Cliff Johnson, or shore up your defense. They chose the latter:

Lee May was shipped to Baltimore. Watson moved to 1B (-8) The Astros traded for speedster Jose Cruz, a disappointment in St. Louis, but a solid glove (+9) in 75. Cesar Cedeno was gold glove material and Greg Gross offered a line drive bat with a -3 rating. In the infield, they moved prospect Rob Andrews (-8) into 2B, down a total of 14 points from Tommy Helms the previous year.

The result in runs saved? Totaled, a drop to -1. Watson suffered at 1B (-8), Cedeno had an off year (-4) and Andrews, categorically speaking, was a disaster from Helms, a former multiple gold glover and .279 hitter the year before (Helms was still with Houston. An injury situation?).

The Astros finished last in 75 with a miserable 64 wins.

But in 76, Houston made gains with its new lineup, finishing in 3rd with an 80-83 record. They finished 2nd in the NL west in runs scored, but far behind the Big Red Machine in runs (3.86 to 5.29). On the Astros staff were solid pitchers, such as JR Richard, Larry Dierker, Joquin Andujar, Ken Forsch and Joe Niekro.

It took until 1979 for Houston to reach prominence in TOT/YR. They finished +3.1, 2nd in the category in the NL. Their record was 89-73, 1 and 1/2 game back of the Reds in the West.

In a 2006 article, Bill James alluded to the fact that saber-theories were missing something with fielding. The swings were too wide. The obvious inference would be that balls on play is controlled much more by pitchers, or luck than thought. But something appears to be missing when a Cesar Cedeno swings from a +8 to a -4 in one year.

I see those kinds of inexplicable swings looking over these seasons, though the numbers do correlate strongly with reputation of players at that time. And the category continues to be a good indicator of how the defense will be shuffled by teams during the off-seasons.

More to come, if anybody remains interested in this subject.

06-09-2009, 12:41 PM	#18 (permalink)
knockahoma All Star Reserve Join Date: Dec 2002 Posts: 792 Thanked 75x in 31 posts	Continuing the look at Teams through the prism of the TOT/LG stat: 1974 NL West Dodgers 3.4 TOT/YR Reds 5.4 Braves 6.0 Astros 0.6 Giants - 0.3 Padres -8.4 The first thing that strikes me is that while, pitching and defense were long aspects of pride for LA, the Reds looked better in both TOT/YR and field percentage. In fact, LA finished a point under league fielding average. The Reds finished just 4 games back, the only real threat to LA. In actuality, the reps of defensive players remain intact. It was the horrific performances off the bench by Lee Lacy, Von Joshua, Ken McMullen, that brought down LA's score. Jimmy Wynn finished with a nice +12 in CF. Meanwhile, the Braves had discovered in 1973 that, despite Davey Johnson's bizarre and once in a life-time output of 40 homers, Earl Johnson was right about the second baseman's deteriorating range. He finished with a -8. His double play partner, Marty Perez, had upped his score in 72 (a dreadful -13) to league average. But, together, the Johnson/Perez combo had given up -8 runs below league average. In 74, they moved the infield around, depending on if they faced a righty, or a lefty. Johnson split time between 1B (+8) and 2B (-10). Perez played almost exclusively at 2B where his scores vastly improved (+11, .985%) Robinson moved in at SS and played at league average (+1). But the Braves (based on 135 games) improved greatly at these positions over 73's total. +7 at 1B, +19 at 2B and +1 at SS, for a total of 27 runs saved above average. The Astros: Roger Metzger is the surprise to me. In some baseball sims, Metzger was awarded top range. But, by his life-time TOT/YR is only -4. He was a very steady shortstop, though. Once again, I wonder if some gifted athletes at the position flashed with dives, but were often out of position? He had just won the gold glove in 73 with a -4 TOT/YR score. But, he made only 12 errors the entire year. Doug Rader was the same type fielder. Five gold gloves, only 16 errors in 74, compared with Schmidt who ended Rader's GG dynasty with error totals often in the 20s. Catcher/1B Cliff Johnson's score makes the traditionalists happy (-19), cancelling out his 10 homers in part-time duty. Lifetime, he was -14 at 1B, -15 at catcher and a hideous -22 in the OF. The Astros knew his 20 homers in 75 probably didn't cover the statistical and psychological damage caused by Johnson's defense. The bat, in their view, wasn't worth the cost. The Astros sent Johnson off to DH duties in the AL for middle infielder Mike Fischlin. Houston's other defensive problem was LF Bob Watson. A fine fielding percentage didn't hide the flaw (a consistent -15 over the past 3 years). It's interesting to note that Houston had here the controversial situation. Throw your bats out there and eat the defensive cost, with 1B Lee May, LF Bob Watson and C Cliff Johnson, or shore up your defense. They chose the latter: Lee May was shipped to Baltimore. Watson moved to 1B (-8) The Astros traded for speedster Jose Cruz, a disappointment in St. Louis, but a solid glove (+9) in 75. Cesar Cedeno was gold glove material and Greg Gross offered a line drive bat with a -3 rating. In the infield, they moved prospect Rob Andrews (-8) into 2B, down a total of 14 points from Tommy Helms the previous year. The result in runs saved? Totaled, a drop to -1. Watson suffered at 1B (-8), Cedeno had an off year (-4) and Andrews, categorically speaking, was a disaster from Helms, a former multiple gold glover and .279 hitter the year before (Helms was still with Houston. An injury situation?). The Astros finished last in 75 with a miserable 64 wins. But in 76, Houston made gains with its new lineup, finishing in 3rd with an 80-83 record. They finished 2nd in the NL west in runs scored, but far behind the Big Red Machine in runs (3.86 to 5.29). On the Astros staff were solid pitchers, such as JR Richard, Larry Dierker, Joquin Andujar, Ken Forsch and Joe Niekro. It took until 1979 for Houston to reach prominence in TOT/YR. They finished +3.1, 2nd in the category in the NL. Their record was 89-73, 1 and 1/2 game back of the Reds in the West. In a 2006 article, Bill James alluded to the fact that saber-theories were missing something with fielding. The swings were too wide. The obvious inference would be that balls on play is controlled much more by pitchers, or luck than thought. But something appears to be missing when a Cesar Cedeno swings from a +8 to a -4 in one year. I see those kinds of inexplicable swings looking over these seasons, though the numbers do correlate strongly with reputation of players at that time. And the category continues to be a good indicator of how the defense will be shuffled by teams during the off-seasons. More to come, if anybody remains interested in this subject. Last edited by knockahoma; 06-09-2009 at 12:57 PM.